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JURISDICTION
The Appellant petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals from a final order of the Utah Labor
Commission dated July 16, 2003. This appeal also includes the Labor Commission's Order
Denying Motion for Review, dated May 1, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS Ol REVIEW
Issue: Whether the Labor Commission's dismissal of Ms. Giles claims against Ace
USA/Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. (hereinafter "PACIFIC") was proper based on the Labor
Commission's factual finding that Ms. Giles was not employed during PACIFIC'S period of
coverage. This issue was preserved on appeal. (R. 720-35; R. 880-883; R. 1030-36, R. 11391142).
Standard of Review: "When reviewing the factual findings made by an administrative
agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-1-301 provides that "[t]he commission has the duty and the
full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or
any other title or chapter it administers."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Ms. Giles filed an application for hearing alleging that she was
entitled to benefits from various defendants.

Specifically, she filed her claim against TAD

Technical Services Corporation and Liberty Mutual Insurance (hereinafter "TAD"), its worker's
compensation carrier.

Other insurance carriers unilaterally were added by the Labor

4

Commission because they were thought to be the insurers at the time of Ms. Giles' second
application for hearing, even though Ms. Giles had not worked for since 1991.
Course of Proceedings: On May 30, 1992, Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing
against Oakridge Country Club and/or the Worker's Compensation Fund. (R. 1-95). As a result
of Ms. Giles claims against Oakridge, Ms. Giles and Oakridge entered into a full and final
settlement agreement. On December 27, 2000, Ms. Giles filed a second Application for Hearing
alleging that additional benefits should be paid as a result of chemically induced porphyria. (R.
96-117). Ms. Giles alleges that during her employment with Oakridge Country Club, she was
exposed to numerous toxic fumes and materials from May, 1991 to December, 1991. (R. 98).
On December 27, 2000, Ms. Giles' filed a motion with the Labor Commission
demanding that an impartial administrative law judge be appointed to the case. (R. 96). Ms.
Giles made the request for an impartial administrative law judge because she felt her case would
not receive fair treatment based on how she had been treated when she had filed her previous
application.
On February 22, 2001, Ms. Giles motion for a non-labor commission administrative law
judge was denied. Because the Labor Commission was the only agency with the ability and
authority to adjudicate worker's compensation claims, Judge LaJeunesse denied Ms. Giles'
request for an impartial administrative law judge.
On May 14, 2001, the Labor Commission unilaterally amended the Application for
Hearing to include numerous other insurers, which included PACIFIC. (R. 195). Ms. Giles
stated in her Application for Hearing that her alleged exposure to the chemicals occurred from
May, 1991 through December, 1991. (R. 98). Ms. Giles further stated that she has been unable
to work from December 19, 2001 through the present. (R. 98).
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On June 8, 2001, TAD filed an Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment in which
TAD challenged Ms. Giles' recent claim for additional benefits. (R. 340-70). Ms. Giles filed a
response to TAD's Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that she should be allowed to
apportion her compensation between TAD and Oakridge Country Club. (R. 375-85). On July
18, 2001, TAD filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. (R.
421-34).
On July 23, 2001, TAD filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal, seeking to dismiss Ms.
Giles' attempt to appeal because there had been no final order from which to appeal. (R. 45076). On December 6, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals granted TAD's motion and dismissed Ms.
Giles' appeal because the Court lacked jurisdiction on an appeal made before a final order had
been entered below. (R. 686-87). Ms. Giles subsequently appealed the denial of her appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court, which refused to hear the claim. (R. 702).
On August 9, 2001, PACIFIC requested Ms. Giles' claims against it be dismissed
because she did not work for TAD from 1994 to 1997, the period in which PACIFIC provided
insurance coverage. (R. 623). On September 10, 2001, Ms. Giles filed a response to PACIFIC'S
motion to dismiss. (R. 673).
On June 6, 2002, the Labor Commission ruled on TAD's Motion for Summary Judgment
and PACIFIC'S Motion to Dismiss. (R. 720-35). The Labor Commission ruled that PACIFIC
had not provided coverage from 1985 through 1991, the term of Ms. Giles's employment and
claims. Accordingly, the Labor Commission determined that PACIFIC was not a proper party to
these proceedings. Ultimately, the Labor Commission determined that PACIFIC'S insurance
policy did not cover the time period of May, 1991 through December, 1991, the period of time
Ms. Giles alleges she was exposed to toxic chemicals.
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On July 8, 2002, Ms. Giles filed a Motion for Review. On May 1, 2003, the Labor
Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for Review. (R. 1030-36). On May21, 2003,
Ms. Giles filed a Request for Reconsideration, (R. 1037-1120), which the Labor Commission
denied after briefing by the parties involved. (R. 1231-35).
On July 16, 2003, Ms. Giles filed a Petition for Review, (R. 1236-37), and filed her
Amended Petition for Review on July 23, 2003. (R. 1239-40). Ms. Giles subsequently filed her
Docketing Statement. On May 21, 2004, Ms. Giles filed an incomplete Appellant's Brief lacking
material and pages. She subsequently filed her Supplement to Appellant's Brief on May 26,
2004 and filed her Amended Brief on June 1, 2004.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Giles worked as a secretary for TAD from September, 1985 to October, 1990. (R.
354). After Ms. Giles left her employment at TAD, she worked for Oakridge Country Club
(hereinafter "Oakridge") from May, 1991 to December, 1991. (R. 98). PACIFIC did not
provide TAD insurance coverage from September, 1985 to December, 1991. (R. 623). From
May, 1991 to December, 1991, Ms. Giles alleges she suffered from an occupational disease as a
result of chemical exposure at Oakridge. (R. 98).
On or about June 9, 1992, Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing alleging she was
injured on September 7, 1991, as a result of chlorine gas exposure while working for Oakridge.
(R. 1-95). On January 4, 1993, the parties presented their case at a hearing in which the
administrative law judge ruled that Ms. Giles did not meet her burden of proof and denied her
claim. (R.36-49).
On January 5, 1995, Ms. Giles was diagnosed with chemically acquired or chemically
induced porphyria from exposure to toxic fumes while she was employed at Oakridge. (R. 367-
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69). Oakridge continued to dispute liability, but a settlement agreement was reached and Ms.
Giles was then entitled to medical benefits and compensation as a result of the compensation
agreement. (R. 360-70).
On December 27, 2000, Ms. Giles filed another Application for Hearing seeking
additional benefits from Oakridge and the Workers' Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF").
(R. 96-99). Ms. Giles requested the addition of TAD and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance,
as parties to this claim.

(R. 133-35). On February 23, 2001, the Labor Commission sent

Oakridge, WCF, and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance a Request for Answer. (R. 123-124). On
May 14, 2001, the Labor Commission sent an Amended Request for Answer to TAD, PACIFIC,
and Liberty Mutual Insurance. (R. 195-196).
On August 9,2001, PACIFIC sent Judge LaJeunesse a request for dismissal of Ms. Giles'
claims because PACIFIC'S term of coverage was from 1994 to 1997. (R. 623). Ms. Giles
admitted that she had not worked from December, 1991 to the present. (R. 98). Ms. Giles did
not work for TAD from 1994 to 1997 and, therefore, PACIFIC requested that Judge LaJeunesse
dismiss Ms. Giles' claims against PACIFIC. (R. 623).
On June 6, 2002, Judge LaJeunesse issued his Ruling on the Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions to Dismiss. (R. 720-35). In the Labor Commission's Findings of Fact,
the fact that PACIFIC did not provide coverage from 1985 through 1991 was uncontested. (R.
724).

Judge LaJeunesse, therefore, dismissed Ms. Giles' claims against PACIFIC because

PACIFIC did not provide coverage in 1991 and Ms. Giles did not work for TAD during the term
of PACIFIC'S insurance coverage from 1994 to 1997. (R. 732-33). This holding was upheld by
the Labor Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review. (R. 1032-33).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because it is uncontested that PACIFIC did not provide insurance coverage from 1985
through 1991, the Labor Commission properly dismissed PACIFIC as a party to this claim. Ms.
Giles claims that she is entitled to benefits as a result of her toxic exposure during her
employment with Oakridge from May, 1991 through December, 1991. PACIFIC'S insurance
coverage of TAD was from 1994-1997. These facts are undisputed. Consequently, the Labor
Commission correctly ruled that PACIFIC was not a proper party to Ms. Giles' Application for
Hearing because PACIFIC did not provide coverage from 1985 to 1991.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE MS. GILES DID NOT WORK FOR TAD DURING PACIFIC'S
COVERAGE PERIOD, THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY DISMISSED
MS. GILES CLAIMS AGAINST PACIFIC
Ms. Giles posits that the Labor Commission incorrectly granted PACIFIC'S motion to
dismiss. PACIFIC asserts that the grant of its motion to dismiss was proper given the undisputed
facts in this case. It is undisputed that PACIFIC'S insurance policy with TAD was from 19941997. (R. 732; R. 1032). It is also undisputed that Ms. Giles' period of potential exposure to
chemicals at Oakridge was from May, 1991 to December, 1991. (R. 724; R. 1030). Based upon
these undisputed facts, the Labor Commission correctly dismissed Ms. Giles' claims against
PACIFIC because PACIFIC'S insurance coverage did not encompass Ms. Giles' years of
employment from 1985 to 1991. (R. 732). Likewise, PACIFIC did not provide worker's
compensation coverage for Oakridge from May, 1991 to December, 1991. (R. 623).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b), the Labor Commission may grant a motion to
dismiss "if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party . . ." Administrative Law Judge LaJeunesse granted
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PACIFIC'S motion to dismiss based on the uncontroverted facts, above, and the lack of an
assertion that PACIFIC issued an insurance policy for any of Ms. Giles' employers from 1985 to
1991. (R. 733). Judge LaJeunesse dismissed PACIFIC as a party to Ms. Giles' claims because
there was no insurance coverage and, therefore, the Labor Commission "lacked the authority to
keep [PACIFIC] as respondents in the present case." (R. 733).
The Labor Commission based its ruling on a Utah Supreme Court case which determined
the commission was "without the authority to apply the terms of an insurance policy to an
individual or corporation not named in the policy as the insured." State Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Comm'n, 115 Utah 383, 386, 205 P.2d 245, 246 (1949). In State Ins. Fund, the employee's
injury occurred after the termination of the policy and before a new policy was issued. Id.
Accordingly, because the employee was not covered under the insurance policy at the time of the
accident, the commission could not apply the terms of the policy in place after the accident had
occurred. Id.
In the present case, the Labor Commission "has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction,
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter
it administers." Utah Code Annotated § 34A-1-301. The Labor Commission found PACIFIC'S
insurance policy coverage was from 1994 through 1997. The Labor Commission found that
PACIFIC did not insure TAD from 1985 through 1991, the time period in which Ms. Giles
alleges she was exposed to toxic chemicals and in which her alleged claims arose. The Labor
Commission found these facts to be uncontested. Accordingly, the Labor Commission dismissed
PACIFIC as a party to Ms. Giles' claims because Ms. Giles did not work for TAD between the
years of 1994 through 1997.
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Because the Labor Commission held that PACIFIC'S insurance policy did not include the
time period from 1985 to 1991, and held that Ms. Giles did not work for TAD during the
PACIFIC policy period from 1994 to 1997, the Labor Commission correctly held that PACIFIC
was not a proper party to Ms. Giles' claims for benefits. The Labor Commission's findings of
fact are based on undisputed evidence and, therefore, there is substantial evidence supporting the
Labor Commission's determination that no PACIFIC insurance policy was in place from 1985
through 1991.
CONCLUSION
The Order Denying Motion for Review was properly entered in this case. Based upon the
Labor Commission's uncontested factual findings concerning PACIFIC insurance coverage, the
Labor Commission correctly determined that PACIFIC did not provide worker's compensation
coverage from 1985 through 1991 and, therefore, Ms. Giles' claims against PACIFIC were
properly dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 2004.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Appellee's Ace
Employer's Insurance Company
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Case No. 20001228
GLENDA W. GILES,
Petitioner,
vs.

*
*
*
*
*
*

OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and/or *
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND *
OF UTAH and/or WASATCH CREST *
MUTUAL INS., and EMPLOYERS'
*
REINSURANCE FUND;
*
TAD RESOURCES nka ADECCO and/or*
CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE CO.*
and/or ACE USA/PACIFIC
*
EMPLOYERS INS. CO. and/or
*
LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.;
*
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
*

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse

*

Respondents,

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Glenda Giles, filed an "Occupational Disease Claim" with the Utah Labor
Commission on December 27, 2000, and claimed entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation. Ms. Giles' claim for workers' compensation benefits arose out of her alleged
contraction of "chemically induced porphyria" as a result of exposure to "numerous toxic fumes
and materials" during the course of her employment with Oakridge Country Club (Oakridge),
TAD Resources nka Adecco (Adecco), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
The respondents denied that Ms. Giles' employment with respondents exposed her to substances
which medically caused porphyria. The respondents argued that Ms. Giles' alleged porphyria
resulted from causes other than her employment conditions.

Giles v. Oakridge Country Club et al
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss
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Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF), Oakridge, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF),
Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co. (Wasatch Crest), all contended that Ms. Giles' released them
from further workers' compensation liability as to her employment with Oakridge when on
March 8, 1995 she entered into a "Settlement Agreement."
Adecco claimed that Ms. Giles' failed to meet certain statutes of limitations with respect to the
filing of her claim. ACE USA/Pacific Employers' Mutual Ins. Co. (ACE) and Constitution State
Service Co. (Constitution) both denied that they provided insurance coverage for Adecco during
the periods of Ms. Giles' employment. Finally, a question existed in my mind as to whether the
Labor Commission exercised any Jurisdiction over the IRS, a federal agency.
II. ISSUES.
1.

Did Glenda Giles' employment with any or all of the respondents expose her to "toxic
fumes and materials" that caused her to suffer porphyria?

2.

Is Glenda Giles' Occupational Disease Claim against any or all of the respondents
precluded by the March 8, 1995 Settlement Agreement?

3.

Did Glenda Giles' fail to file her workers' compensation claims against Adecco within
the applicable statutes of limitations?1

4.

Should the respondents, Wasatch Crest, ACE, and Constitution, be dismissed from the
present action because they never provided insurance coverage for any of the respondent
employers during the times relevant to this case?

5.

Does the Labor Commission have jurisdiction to adjudicate the workers' compensation
liability of the Internal Revenue Service?
III. PROCEEDINGS.

On December 27, 2000 Ms. Giles filed the present Occupational Disease claim based on her
alleged exposure to "toxic fumes and materials" during the course of her employment with
Oakridge from May 1991, through December 1991. On March 5, 2001 Wasatch Crest filed a
Request for Dismissal from the present claim based on the assertion that Wasatch Crest never
insured Oakridge during the period May 1991, through December 1991. Wasatch Crest filed a
number of subsequent motions to dismiss along the same lines.

1

1 never reached this issue, because I found resolution of the other issues dispositive.
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On March 23, 2001 WCF filed an answer to Ms. Giles' Occupational Disease Claim. WCF
denied the existence of any evidence that demonstrated a causal connection between Ms. Giles'
porphyria and her employment with Oakridge. WCF also claimed that the Settlement Agreement
of March 8, 1995 released Oakridge and WCF.
On April 4, 2001 Constitution filed a response that Constitution provided no coverage for
Adecco during the relevant time periods at issue in this case. On May 24, 2001 ACE also filed a
response that ACE provided no coverage for Adecco during the relevant time periods at issue in
this case.
Adecco and Liberty Mutual filed an answer to Ms. Giles' Occupational Disease Claim. Adecco
denied the existence of any evidence that demonstrated a causal connection between Ms. Giles'
porphyria and her employment with Adecco. On the same day Liberty Mutual and Adecco filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment. Adecco argued that Ms. Giles' claims failed for untimeliness
under applicable statutes of limitations.
On July 11, 2001 ERF filed a Motion to Dismiss ERF from the present action. ERF raised the
same legal defenses advanced by WCF.
Ms. Giles filed her own assorted dispositive motions on April 4, 2001. Additionally, Ms. Giles
filed at various times motions to default each of the respondents for untimely answers.2
In the meantime, Ms. Giles requested the appointment of an Administrative Law Judge outside
the Labor Commission. Ms. Giles pursued her request all the way to the Utah Supreme Court,
which ultimately denied her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 8, 2002. The Utah Court of
Appeals remitted the case back to the Labor Commission on May 9, 2002.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

The Respondents, Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

On March 8, 1995 Judge Timothy C. Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah nka Labor
Commission issued an Order that adopted a Settlement Agreement entered into by Glenda Giles,
Oakridge, WCF and ERF. Ms. Giles and her attorney Phillip Shell both executed the Settlement
Agreement.

2

IRS was the only respondent that failed to file an answer in this case.
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The Settlement Agreement between Ms. Giles, WCF and ERF stated in relevant part:
2.

The applicant (Glenda Giles) has filed a claim for workers' compensation
insurance benefits in connection with allegations that she was exposed to
chlorine gas in the course of her employment with the Oakridge Country
Club on September 7, 1991. She submits that she is permanently and
totally disabled from further employment as a direct result of the physical
and mental injuries allegedly, including organic brain damage, sustained
via the exposure.

3.

[t]he employer denies any causal relationship between this incident and the
applicant's health difficulties.

4.

In light of this dispute, and in light of the varying odds for success for the
claims of the parties, it is the desire of the parties to reach a compromise
settlement of a claim of disputed validity. The parties are willing, as set
forth below to stipulate that the claimant is permanently and totally
disabled, but that any benefits paid shall be as set forth and limited by the
terms of this agreement.

5.

For the purpose of this compromise of this disputed claim, the defendants
agree to pay the applicant compensation for permanent total disability at
the rate of $135.00 per week.

7.

The applicant's commencement date for permanent total disability is
agreed to be December 1, 1991. In light of her age and physical
limitations, she is not considered to be a candidate for successful
vocational rehabilitation. She qualified for Social Security Disability
beginning December 1, 1991.

8.

Based on the forgoing, the employer/carrier shall pay the applicant the
lump sum amount of $21,060.00 in compensation in full settlement of
their portion of her workers' compensation claim of September 7, 1991.
This represents $135.00 per week for 156 weeks beginning December 1,
1991. The defendants shall not be responsible for any medical or health
care benefits, except that the Defendants shall reimburse the applicant in
the sum of $12,000.00 for past medical bills and expenses incurred in
connection with her alleged September 7, 1991 injury. Of this amount,
$6,000.00....The total lump sum payment of $33,060.00, less attorneys
fees set forth below, shall be paid upon approval of this agreement by the
Industrial Commission.
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The Employers' Reinsurance Fund agrees to place the applicant on it's permanent total
disability roles beginning December 1, 1994 at the rate of $135.00 per week. Applicant
shall remain on the Fund's payroll for so long as she shall live, or until further order of
the Industrial Commission of Utah, subject to any offsets afforded by the terms of §35-167(5) LLC.A. Upon the applicant reaching the age of 65 years (June 17, 2004), her
weekly compensation rate shall convert to the then prevailing minimum amount based on
36% of the state average weekly wage, as adjusted yearly.

Ms. Giles based her original claim for permanent total disability benefits against the respondents
on a diagnosis of porphyria by Dr. Gordon Baker M.D. dated January 5, 1995. [see: letter of Dr.
Gordon Baker M.D. attached to Ms. Giles' Application for Hearing]. Ms. Giles also based her
present claim for permanent total disability benefits against the respondents on the same
diagnosis of porphyria by Dr. Baker only couched as an occupational disease, rather than an
industrial accident claim, [id.].
B.

The Respondents Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co., Constitution State Service
Co., and AC USA/Pacific Employers Ins. Co.

The respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE all denied that they as insurance
companies provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of Ms. Giles' employers
during the relevant time periods at issue. None of the other parties contradicted the assertions of
the respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE. None of the parties alleged the existence
of insurance policies provided by Wasatch Crest, Constitution, or ACE that covered any of Ms.
Giles' employers during the relevant time periods at issue.
C.

The Respondents TAD Resources nka Adecco and Liberty Mutual Ins, Co.

Ms. Giles' "Occupational Disease Claim" filed on December 27, 2000 originally named only
Oakridge and WCF as respondents. Ms. Giles' initially claimed that her porphyria resulted from
exposure to "numerous toxic fumes and materials in the course of her employment with Oakridge
C.C....the period May 1991 to December 1991." [see: "Occupational Disease Claim" filed
December 27, 2000 page 1].
On March 14, 2001 Ms. Giles filed a letter that obliquely requested the joinder of Adecco and its
insurance carrier Liberty to her Occupational Disease Claim as respondents. On March 30, 2001
Ms. Giles provided to the Labor Commission the address of Adecco.
On May 14, 2001 the Labor Commission sent an "Amended Request for Answer" to Adecco and
Liberty. On June 8, 2001 Adecco and Liberty filed an "Answer" and "Motion for Summary
Judgment." Adecco claimed inter alia that Ms. Giles presented no evidence that linked her
employment at Adecco with her porphyria.
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Dr. Baker's letters dated January 5, 1995, and May 3, 1995, constituted the only medical
evidence provided by Ms. Giles in support of her Occupational Disease Claim and her multiple
responses to the various motions filed in this case. Dr. Baker's January 5, 1995 letter stated in
pertinent part that:
Glenda Giles is a 55-year-old woman who was in good health until she was
working at a country club in Utah. At that time, extensive remodeling was going
on. Chlorine was used for a junior Olympic swimming pool in the basement. She
was exposed to chlorine gas, which has been previously documented.
She has extensive documentation of her initial exposure and there is no need to
repeat this.
This (tests) would indicate that she has an intoxication or chemically acquired or
chemically induced porphyria.
Porphyria is considered to be a rare hereditary disease; however, porphyria may be
acquired by exposure to a group of porphyric drugs and chemicals. The acquired
porphyria may be considered to be the result of an environmental insult or poison
on either 1. A genetically predisposed individual, or 2. a previously normal
individual with no familial history or predisposition to this disease.
**********

The causes of acquired porphyria are:
1. Drugs. Over 20 drugs are known to induce or cause porphyria including
barbituates, chloriphenical, Danazol, Ergot alkaloids, glutethamide, Griseufulvin,
imipramine, Meprobamate, Metho-Dopa, Fenton, Sulfonamides, Albutamide,
birth control pills with estrogens, and many others.
2. Chemicals. Many, at least 50 environmental porphyrogenic substances include
lead, paints, metal fumes, arsenic, vinyl chloride, alcohols, glycols and their
derivatives, polychlorinated biphenals (PCB), Dioxin, Chlorobenzina, possibly all
chlorinated hydrocarbons or any chemical the (sic) mimics estrogen. One large
outbreak was caused by grain contaminated with the fungacided
hexachlorabenzine.
3. Infectious Hepatitis C is a major cause of porphyria.
4. Malnutrition can bring on a hereditary form.
**********
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In summary, then, Glenda Giles has developed porphyria as a result of exposure to
toxic materials at work at a country club. In addition to be (sic) exposed to
chlorine, she was exposed to extensive materials in remodeling including
carpeting. She did notice illness in this area and she was consistently better away
from this area.
Tests at the Mayo Clinic do indicate that she does have porphyria. It is highly
unlikely that she had this previously as she does have a triple enzyme defect, and
the hereditary forms of porphyria usually will have one enzyme defect, [emphasis
added].
On May 3, 1995 Dr. Baker added:
She has had multiple exposures. She was not only exposed to chlorine gas in a
one-time exposure, which could be significant, she also was chronically exposed
to chemical fumes used in extensive remodeling. So she would have been
exposed to the different building materials and also office machinery. She was
exposed to copiers, fax machines, and carbonless copy paper, which may release
many toxic substances. She was also exposed to new electronic equipment
including computers. There could have been other materials used at the country
club. Golf courses are well-known for having large amounts of pesticides being
constantly sprayed.
In sum, Dr. Baker listed a host of potential environmental factors as possible contributing causes
of Ms. Giles' porphyria. However, Dr. Baker specifically opined that Ms Giles' "developed
porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic materials at" Oakridge. Dr. Baker emphasized the
unlikelihood that Ms. Giles developed porphyria prior to her employment at Oakridge.
Ms. Giles acknowledged that Dr. Baker directed his opinion concerning the medical causation of
her porphyria exclusively toward her exposure to chemicals at Oakridge. [see: Petitioner's
Response to "Answer' Filed by Respondents Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensation
Fund page 4 filed April 4, 2001]. Ms. Giles observed:
The doctor who diagnosed Petitioner's occupational disease has stated that her
exposure to the many chemicals involved in the re-modeling and new construction
of the club house; the many chemicals used in and around the club house, and on
the golf course grounds; together with the office supplies and equipment were
sufficient to produce the chemically induced porphyrinopathy. [id.].
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Ms. Giles confirmed that:
Petitioner's case is primarily directed at Oakridge Country Club, and Workers
Compen-sation (sic) Fund. All other parties have been joined in this case because
Petitioner did not work for Oakridge for twelve consecutive months, and therefore
apportionment is required by law. There can be no doubt that Petitioner became
permanently and totally disabled while in Oakridge Country Club's employ.
However, there are substantial questions concerning the causal contribution of her
prior employers. The extent of these Respondents' liability is a question of fact
for the Labor Commission to determine through these proceedings, [see:
"Petitioner's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Respondents';
Adecco f/k/a Tad Technical Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance
Compari)" at pages 4-5, filed June 18, 2001].
Ms. Giles alleged that she worked for Adecco from September 1985, to October 1990. [see:
Occupational Disease Claim Sec. J.]. In her response to Adecco's "Motion for Summary
Judgment," Ms. Giles admitted that: "The extent of these Respondents' causal contribution to
Petitioner's chemically induced porphyrinopathy has \et Xv be determined." [see: Petitioner's
Response to these Respondents' Motion for Summar * (,< •-,.
i umbered paragraph 2 filed
June 18, 2001], Ms. Giles further statedPetitioner submits that when she filed her notice of occupational disease w
Industrial Commission of Utah on May 19, 1985, she stated therein: i also
worked for McDonnell Aircraft (a subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas) In the office
located in the hangers at Hill Air Force Base. I worked there for five years (1985
to October 1990). There were numerous fumes there.' In addition, Petitioner
testified on 4 January 1993 at the hearing on her occupational injury claim: T told
the Workers Comp people that I worked at Hill Field for five years in the hangers;
and that once a year during the winter when they closed the hangers up to keep it
warm, I would develop bronchitis.' (Citation omitted). Petitioner does not know
all of the chemicals and fumes she was exposed to while in TAD's employ: but
she does know that she was exposed to these hazards on a daily basis while
working for TAD.
**********

Petitioner admits she knew on 5 January 1995 that her occupational disease was
work related; but she did not know then, and still does not know, to what extent
the exposure she endured while working for TAD may have aggravated,
predisposed, or contributed to her diagnosed occupational disease, [id. at pp. 23][emphasis added].
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On June 25, 2001 Ms. Giles filed "Petitioner's Response to 'Answer' filed by Respondents
Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical Services Corporation and Liberty Mutual" wherein she reiterated:
As stated in her Response to these Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Petitioner informed TAD in May 1995 that she was exposed to numerous fumes
while in their employ. Petitioner does not know to what extent her exposures
while employed by TAD affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her
occupational disease. [Petitioner's Response to 'Answer' filed by Respondents
Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical Services Corporation and Liberty Mutual p. 4
Response to Sixth Defense filed June 25, 2001][emphasis added].
In her "Response to Memorandum in Support of Respondents', Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical
Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Motion for Summary
Judgement" filed on July 28, 2001, Ms. Giles' offered a slightly more specific description of the
substances she believed her employment at Adecco exposed her to:
'Petitioner did notice strange odors which she believed to be solvents, cleaning
materials, exhaust fumes, welding and soldering fumes, jet fuel, adhesives, paint
fumes, carpet, and carpet glues.' (Ms. Giles quoting her own answer to
respondents' interrogatory No. 21). Petitioner also mentioned a new computer
system, a leased copy machine, a FAX machine, and working with newly printed
documents....'Petitioner was evacuated from her office and the hanger on at least
one occasion when the chemical alarms sounded.' Although Petitioner was not
notified what chemical caused the alarm, or what effects the exposure might have,
this is evidence of injurious exposure while employed by TAD at Hill Airforce
Base. ["Response to Memorandum in Support of Respondents', Adecco f/k/a
TAD Technical Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
Motion for Summary Judgement" at pages 3-4 filed on July 28, 2001].
Nevertheless, earlier in her answer to interrogatory No. 21 Ms. Giles stated:
These exposures occurred eleven to sixteen years ago, and it is impossible for
Petitioner, at this late date, to compile a list of each exposure; on what date or
dates they occurred; the length of time of exposure; the quantity of fume exposed
to; the source or sources of each fume. Petitioner was exposed to toxic fumes on
a daily basis, but has no way of knowing the identity of all the toxic materials she
was exposed to. [see: "Reply Memorandum in Support of Respondents, Adecco
f/k/a TAD Technical Service Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment" Exhibit "A" filed July 18, 2001].
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The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this case, and taken in the light most
favorable to Ms. Giles, established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic
materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any prior industrial exposure. Accordingly,
Ms. Giles' own medical evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles' porphyria.
Further, Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her exposure to any porphyric
substances while employed at Adecco remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time and place
of any such exposure. At best Ms. Giles could only express her belief as to the type of
substances her employment at Adecco exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of
identifying with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details concerning the alleged
exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that she did not know to what extent her exposures while
employed by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her porphyria.
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a
hedge against apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. With her case against
Adecco mired in mere speculation, Ms. Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell
beyond her means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with apportionment if relevant.
Since any proof of a causal connection between Ms. Giles employment with Adecco and her
porphyria is admittedly beyond her means, Ms. Giles' claim against Adecco must be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Standard for Motions for Summary Judgment.

Utah Code §63-46b-1(4) provides in pertinent part that:
This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative
proceeding from:
*

s|c s)e *

s|e *

j|e s|e :|e s|e

(b) granting a timely motion ... for summary judgement if the requirements of...
Rule 56 ... of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party ....
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states in relevant part that:
(c) [T]he judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law.
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B.

The Respondents, Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah and Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-16 (1994) in effect at the time of the March 8, 1995 Settlement agreement
provided in relevant part:
(1)

The commission has the duty and full power, jurisdiction, and authority to
determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter
that it administers and to:

(e)

promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes
between employers and employees.

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld a decision by an Industrial Commission administrative law
judge that a "Compromise and Settlement Agreement" executed by a claimant/employee,
employer/respondent, and Second Injury Fund (now ERF), barred the claimant/employee's
subsequent claim for permanent total disability compensation. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748
P. 2d 582 (Utah App. 1988). In Wilburn the claimant/employee (Wilburn) received a 36% whole
person impairment apportioned 10% to the industrial low back injury at issue, 15% to a
preexisting low back problem, and 15% to a nonindustrial cervical spine pathology, [id. at 584].
The respondents in Wilburn paid Mr. Wilburn some temporary total, and permanent partial,
disability benefits, [id.]. Mr. Wilburn then notified the respondents that he intended to file for
permanent total disability benefits, [id.]. The parties then entered into the ''Compromise and
Settlement Agreement" whereby the respondents paid Mr. Wilburn some additional permanent
partial disability benefits, [id.].
After the "Compromise and Settlement Agreement" Mr. Wilburn filed a claim against
respondents with the then Industrial Commission for permanent total disability compensation,
[id.]. The administrative law judge ultimately ruled that:
The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was therefore binding and barred
plaintiffs claim for permanent and total disability compensation, [id.].
As noted above, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge,
[id. at 588].
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The undisputed facts of the present claim verified that Ms. Giles entered into a "Settlement
Agreement" with the respondents Oakridge, WCF, and ERF on March 8, 1995. The "Settlement
Agreement" established that Ms. Giles became permanently and totally disabled as a result of
porphyria she allegedly contracted from her employment with Oakridge. [see: paragraphs 2 and 7
of the "Settlement Agreement"]. The respondents agreed to pay Ms. Giles a compromised,
weekly benefit rate of $135.00 for her permanent total disability allegedly incurred while
employed for Oakridge. [see: paragraphs 8 and 9 of the "Settlement Agreement"]. The
"Settlement Agreement" specifically stated that the sum paid represented a compromise of a
disputed claim, [see: paragraphs 4 and 5 of the "Settlement Agreement"].
Ms. Giles couched her present claim as an occupational disease rather than an industrial accident.
Nevertheless, Ms. Giles' present Occupational Disease Claim essentially constituted the same
claim for permanent total disability benefits that she compromised in her "Settlement
Agreement" approved on March 8, 1995. Both Ms. Giles' claims consisted of claims for
permanent total disability compensation derived from her diagnosis of porphyria allegedly caused
by her employment at Oakridge. Accordingly, the March 8, 1995 "Settlement Agreement"
barred Ms. Giles' present Occupational Disease Claim. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P. 2d
582.
The mere fact that Ms. Giles' recast her claim for permanent total disability compensation as an
occupational disease rather than an industrial accident failed to create a separate and distinct
remedy from her first claim. Utah Code Ann. §35-2-110 (1991) in effect at the time of the March
8, 1995 Settlement agreement stated:
The compensation provided under this chapter (occupational disease chapter) is
not in addition to compensation which may be payable under Title 35, Chapter 1
(industrial accidents chapter), and in all cases where injury results by reason of an
accident arising out of an in the course of employment and compensation is
payable for the injury under Title 35, Chapter 1, no compensation under this
chapter shall be payable.
In short, Ms. Giles is not allowed double recovery for permanent total disability compensation
from the same injury by the same employer under both the industrial accidents, and occupational
disease, chapters of the Workers Compensation Act.3
3

The Utah Supreme Court held that:

[a]n employee is not entitled to compensation for wage loss for which the
employer has already compensated him or her. Realistically, and in view of our
workers' compensation plan, any other holding ignores the plain language of the

Giles v. Oakridge Country Club et al
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss
page 13

Ms. Giles argued that Utah Code §35-1-90 prevented her from compromising her rights to further
benefits via the March 8, 1995 "Settlement Agreement." [see: Petitioner's Response to Answer
Filed by Respondents Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensation Fund" filed April 4,
2001 at page 8]. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-90 (1917) in effect at the time of the March 8, 1995
"Settlement Agreement" stated in part:
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this title
shall be valid.
The Court in Wilburn specifically addressed this argument:
Under this provision, settlements are appropriate only when the compensable
nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover is
doubtful, (citation omitted). Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P. 2d at 586.
The "Settlement Agreement" of March 8, 1995 specifically stated that: "it is the desire of the
parties to reach a compromise settlement of a claim of disputed validity." [see: paragraph 4 of the
"Settlement Agreement"]. In such a case, the Court in Wilburn held "§ 35-1-90 is no bar to
enforceability of the agreement." [id. at 587].
C.

The Respondents Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co., Constitution State Service
Co., and AC USA/Pacific Employers Ins. Co.

The respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE all denied that they as insurance carriers
provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of Ms. Giles' employers during the
relevant time periods at issue. None of the other parties contradicted the assertions of the
respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE. None of the parties alleged the existence of
insurance policies provided by Wasatch Crest, Constitution, or ACE that covered any of Ms.
Giles' employers during the relevant time periods at issue.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that:
[t]he Industrial Commission is without authority to apply the terms of an
insurance policy to an individual or a corporation not named in the policy as the
insured. State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 115 Utah 383, , 205
P. 2d 245,
(1949)
workers' compensation statutes and would result in claimants' receiving duplicate
payments for loss of earning capacity. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett 737 P. 2d 986,
988 (Utah 1987).
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Absent any assertion that Wasatch Crest, Constitution, or ACE issued workers' compensation
insurance policies for any of Ms. Giles' employers during the relevant time periods at issue, the
Labor Commission lacks authority to keep them as respondents in the present case.
D.

The Respondents TAD Resources nka Adecco and Liberty Mutual Ins, Co.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107 (1991) provided that:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational disease is defined as any
disease or illness which arises out of and in the course of employment and is
medically caused or aggravated by that employment.
Ms. Giles as the petitioner in the present matter carried the burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that her porphyria arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco.
[see gen: Ashcroft v. The Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 855 P. 2d 267, 269 (Ut App. 1993)
(petitioner's burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence)]. Ms. Giles also bore the burden
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her employment at Adecco medically caused
her porphyria.
The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this case, and taken in the light most
favorable to Ms. Giles, established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic
materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any prior industrial exposure. Accordingly,
Ms. Giles' own medical evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles' porphyria,
[see gen: Stevenson v. The Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 641 P. 2d 117 (Utah 1982).
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her exposure to any porphyric substances while
employed at Adecco remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time and place of any such
exposure. At best Ms. Giles could only express her belief as to the type of substances her
employment at Adecco exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying with any
certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles
also conceded that did not know to what extent her exposures while employed by Adecco
affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her porphyria.
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a
hedge against apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms. Giles essentially
conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her means and left it to the Labor Commission to
deal with apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked the means to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria arose out of and in the course of her
employment with Adecco her claim must be dismissed.
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E.

The Respondent Internal Revenue Service.

Ms. Giles requested joinder of her former employer the Internal Revenue Service. However, a
federal employee's remedy for a workers' compensation claim lies exclusively under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act 5 U.S.C. § 8101-8152 (FECA). see: Miller v. V.A. Medical
Center, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 7659 (10th Cir. 2001) and Hope v. Berrett 756 P. 2d 102, 103 (Ut.
App 1988). Further, the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Hope a "[fjederal employee...is not
actually an 'employee' as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (1987)." i± at fn 1.
Consequently, the Utah Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider Ms. Giles' occupational
disease claim against the IRS under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. Ms. Giles must
pursue her claim against the IRS pursuant to FECA before the United States Secretary of Labor.
VI. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Glenda Giles' Occupational Disease Claim against
Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins.,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, TAD Resources nka Adecco, Constitution State Service Co.,
ACE USA/Pacific Employers' Ins. Co., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., and Internal Revenue Service, is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this 6th day of June 2002,

ick^rd M. La Jeunesse
-Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse summarily dismissed Glenda W. Giles' claim for
benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.).
Mrs. Giles now asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Judge La Jeunesse's decision.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On approximately May 30, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application for Hearing seeking
workers' compensation benefits from Oakridge Country Club and its insurance carrier, Workers
Compensation Fund. Mrs. Giles' Application alleged injuries from exposure to chlorine gas at
Oakridge on September 7,1991. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was later added as a defendant
to Mrs. Giles' claim. On March 8, 1995, the parties resolved this claim by settlement agreement.
On December 27,2000, Mrs. Gilesfileda second Application against Oakridge and Workers'
Compensation Fund, this time for "porphyria" allegedly caused by exposure to toxic fumes at
Oakridge between May and December 1991. Thereafter, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Wasatch
Crest Mutual Insurance, TAD Resources, Constitution State Service Co., ACE USA/Pacific
Employers Ins. Co., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., and the Internal Revenue Service were added as
defendants to Mrs. Giles' second claim.
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Wasatch Crest and ACE-US A/Pacific Employers Insurance Co. each moved for dismissal of
Mrs. Giles' claim on the grounds neither company was an insurance carrier for Mrs. Giles' employers
during any time relevant to Mrs. Giles' claim.
TAD and its insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual, moved for summary judgment on the grounds,
among others, that there was no evidence establishing Mrs. Giles' work at TAD as a cause of her
porphyria.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund, Oakridge and the Workers Compensation Fund moved for
dismissal on the grounds Mrs. Giles' current occupational disease claim was subject to the parties'
settlement of her original workers' compensation claim.
The Internal Revenue Service did not appear or otherwise participate in this matter.
On June 6, 2002, Judge La Jeunesse granted the defendants' various motions for dismissal
and summary judgment. Judge La Jeunesse also dismissed Mrs. Giles' claim against the I.R.S. for
lack ofjurisdiction over that federal agency. Mrs. Giles now seeks Commission review of Judge La
Jeunesse's decision.
The Commission has carefully reviewed Mrs. Giles' motion for review. Much of it deals with
points that are legally irrelevant or factually unsupported. Ultimately, the Commission believes the
following issues are determinative of Mrs. Giles' current claim for occupational disease benefits:
1.
Is there any basis to conclude that Wasatch Crest, ACE-US A/Pacific Employers Insurance
Co., Constitution State Service Co., or other nominal defendants may be liable for Mrs. Giles'
current claim?
2.
Is there a genuine issue of material facts regarding TAD and Liberty Mutual's possible liability
for Mrs. Giles' current claim?
3.
Does the settlement agreement which resolved Mrs. Giles' first claim against Oakridge,
Workers Compensation Fund and ERF bar Mrs. Giles' current claim against those entities?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds there is no genuine dispute regarding the following facts which are
material to resolution of Mrs. Giles' current claim.
On May 30, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application For Hearing with the Utah Industrial
Commission claiming workers' compensation benefits for "seizures, memory loss, sinus, heart and
lung injury" caused by work-related exposure to chlorine gas at Oakridge on September 7, 1991.
Oakridge denied liability for the alleged injuries.
Mrs. Giles' claim was eventually denied by the Commission. Mrs. Giles sought review by the
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Utah Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Mrs. Giles continued to seek medical diagnosis of her
alleged injury. On January 5, 1995, Dr. Baker diagnosed the injury as "chemically acquired or
chemically induced porphyria"fromexposure to toxic fiimes at Oakridge. According to Dr. Baker:
The porphyrias are a group of diseases of heme synthesis in which the over
production of porphyrin compounds results from deficient enyzme activity in the
biosynthetic pathway of heme . . . .

Without attempting to separately describe each different porphyria, general symptoms
of the acute attack may include abdominal pain . . . nausea, vomiting, . . . diarrhea.
Neurological symptoms . . . may include peripheral neuropathy, weakness, . . .
sensory disorder, possible respiratory problems, hallucinations, confusion, depression,
sometimes even seizures.
Although Oakridge continued to dispute Mrs. Giles' claim, the parties agreed to a
compromise settlement. Their written agreement identified Mrs. Giles' claim as "physical and mental
injuries allegedly, including organic brain damage, sustained via the exposure." The agreement
provided for lump-sum and monthly payments to Mrs. Giles in lieu of any other benefits Mrs. Giles
might be entitled to receive for her alleged injuries. The Commission approved the parties'
agreement, the defendants paid the required compensation, and Mrs. Giles' claim was dismissed.
On December 10, 2000, Mrs. Gilesfileda second Application For Hearing with the Labor
Commission, this time seeking benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. This second claim
was based on the same condition, porphyria, that had served as the basis for herfirstclaim under the
Workers' Compensation Act. In support of this second claim, Mrs. Giles submitted the same
diagnosisfromDr. Baker that had been obtained in early 1995 to support herfirstclaim.
Mrs. Giles has presented no evidence that would establish the liability ofWasatch Crest, ACEUSA/Pacific Employers Insurance Co., Constitution State Service Co., or Transportation Insurance
Company with respect to her current occupational disease claim.
Mrs. Giles has failed to submit any evidence of exposure to substances at TAD that caused
or contributed to her porphyria.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In this case, the Commission must determine whether the various defendants are entitled to
summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim against them. Section 63-46b-l(4)(b) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act permits summary judgment if the requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied. Rule 56 allows summary judgment only if the record shows
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."
The parties seeking summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim have the burden of establishing
their right to judgment, even when all facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party . Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists v. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 844 P.2d 322, 324 n. 1 (Utah 1992). In Hill v. Grand Central
Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970),the Utah Supreme Court observed:
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain
whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed
issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by summary judgment even when the parties
properly bring the motion before the court.
The Commission bears the foregoing principles in mind as it considers the propriety of
summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim.
Liability of Wasatch Crest. ACE-USA/Pacific Employers Insurance Co.. Constitution State
Service Co.. Transportation Insurance Company and IRS. Neither Wasatch Crest nor ACEUSA/Pacific were named by Mrs. Giles as defendants in this matter. Through some process that is
not clear from the record, it appears that the Adjudication Division itself added these parties as
defendants in the caption of this case. Likewise,fromtime to time, other insurance carriers such as
"Constitution State" and "Transportation Insurance Company" have been listed as defendants in one
or more pleading, motion or decision in this case. However, the Commission is unaware of any
factual basis by which these companies would have any legal liability to pay Mrs. Giles' current claim.
The Commission therefore concludes that Mrs. Giles has no cognizable claim against these parties.
As to the I.R.S., Judge La Jeunesse correctly noted that the Utah Labor Commission has no
jurisdiction over workers' compensation or occupational disease claims against an instrumentality of
the federal government. Mrs. Giles' claim against the I.R.S. must also be dismissed.
Liability of TAD. The Commission now turns to Mrs. Giles' claim against TAD and its
workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual. TAD and Liberty Mutual were added as
defendants to Mrs. Giles' claim on the grounds that the Occupational Disease Act's apportionment
provisions might reach TAD, as Mrs. Giles' former employers. But for TAD and Liberty Mutual
to incur any liability for Mrs. Giles' alleged occupational disease, Mrs. Giles mustfirstestablish that
her work at TAD exposed her to chemicals that caused or contributed to her porphyria.
Mrs. Giles acknowledges she is unable to produce any evidence establishing what, if any,
chemicals she was exposed to at TAD, nor can she establish the extent of any such chemical
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exposure. Her claims regarding the possibility of exposure to chemicals at TAD are entirely
speculative. Under such circumstances, the Commission agrees with Judge La Jeunesse that the
evidence, even when considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Giles, fails to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding TAD's liability in this matter, and that TAD is therefore entitled to
summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim against TAD.
Mrs. Giles' second claim against Oakridge. As already noted, Mrs. Giles' first claim for
benefits was filed under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Act
defines the coverage of the Act as follows: "An employee... injured . . . by accident arising out of
and in the course of. . . employment, wherever such injury occurred . . . shall be paid . . .
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury . . .." Thus, it is the existence of a workrelated injury that is the basis for payment of benefits under the Worker' Compensation Act.
When Mrs. Giles filed her first claim for benefits against Oakridge in 1992, she initially
described her injury in terms of symptoms: "seizures, memory loss, sinus, heart and lung injury." As
her claim progressed and additional medical evaluations were conducted, these descriptive symptoms
were brought within a single over-arching diagnosis of porphyria. Thus, at the time Mrs. Giles settled
her initial workers' compensation claim, that claim was for the injury of porphyria.
Now, Mrs. Giles has recast her initial claim for workers' compensation benefits for the injury
of porphyria into a claim for occupational disease benefits for the illness of porphyria. In attempting
to obtain benefits under both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act for
the single diagnosis of porphyria, Mrs. Giles runs afoul of the following limitation found in §34A-2311 of the Occupational Disease Act:
The compensation provided under this chapter (the Occupational Disease Act)
is not in addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter (the Workers'
Compensation Act), and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment and compensation is payable for the
injury under Chapter 2, compensation under this chapter may not be payable.
The 1995 settlement agreement between Mrs. Giles and Oakridge and ERF granted certain
workers' compensation benefits to Mrs. Giles for her porphyria. Pursuant to §34A-2-311 of the
Occupational Disease Act, additional compensation for that same condition may not be paid. In light
of the foregoing, the Commission concludes, as did Judge La Jeunesse, that Mrs. Giles' claim against
Oakridge and ERF under the Occupational Disease Act must be dismissed.
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ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of Judge La Jeunesse in this matter and denies Mrs.
Giles' motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this J

day of May, 2003.

s&-

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

16%^-.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Case No. 00-1228
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*

Glenda W. Giles asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision denying
Ms. Giles' claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On March 8,1995, Mrs. Giles, Oakridge Country Club, the Workers Compensation Fund and
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund settled Mrs. Giles' claim for workers' compensation benefits for
alleged injuries from exposure to chlorine gas at Oakridge on September 7,1991.
On December 27, 2000, Mrs. Giles filed another claim against Oakridge and Workers'
Compensation Fund, this time for occupational disease benefits for the disease of "porphyria"
allegedly caused by exposure to toxic fumes at Oakridge between May and December 1991.
Various other parties were later added as defendants to Mrs. Giles' second claim.
On June 6,2002, Judge La Jeunesse summarily dismissed Mrs. Giles' occupational disease
claim. Mrs. Giles then asked the Commission to review Judge LaJeunesse's decision. After careful
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review of the matter, the Commission concluded that three issues were determinative of Mrs. Giles'
current claim for occupational disease benefits:
•

•
•

Is there any basis to conclude that Wasatch Crest, ACE-USA/Pacific Employers Insurance
Co., Constitution State Service Co., or other nominal defendants may be liable for Mrs.
Giles' current claim?
Is there a genuine issue of material facts regarding TAD and Liberty Mutual's possible
liability for Mrs. Giles' current claim?
Does the settlement agreement which resolved Mrs. Giles' first claim against Oakridge,
Workers Compensation Fund and ERF bar Mrs. Giles' current claim against those entities?

Answering the first two issues negatively and the third issue affirmatively, the Commission
concurred with Judge LaJeunesse's dismissal of Mrs. Giles' occupational disease claim.
Ms. Giles now asks the Commission to reconsider its prior decision. Specifically, Mrs. Giles
raises a wide variety of issues that can be loosely categorized as follows:
1. Effect of settlement of prior workers' compensation claim: Mrs. Giles argues that her
initial workers' compensation injury was different than her current occupational disease, and
that settlement of the injury claim should not prevent her from pursuing her occupational
disease claim.
2. Propriety of summary judgment: Mrs. Giles argues that genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding legal and medical causation and other circumstances of her occupational
disease, thereby precluding summary judgment.
3. Procedural errors and other defects in the Commission's adjudicative process: Mrs. Giles
alleges errors regarding proper notice, denial of right to conduct discovery, failure to appoint
a medical panel, lack of good faith, and conflict of interest.
DISCUSSION
Beginning with Mrs. Giles' arguments that her initial workers' compensation claim was for
an "injury" that is different from her current "disease," the Commission has again reviewed the
evidence on that point and remains convinced that both claims relate to the same medical condition,
now diagnosed as "porphyria." Under such circumstances, Mrs. Giles may not receive compensation
for that condition under both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act.
Specifically, §34A-3-l 11 of the Occupational Disease Act provides as follows:
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The compensation provided under this chapter (the Occupational Disease
Act) is not in addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter 2 (the
Workers' Compensation Act), and in all cases when injury results by reason of an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment and compensation is payable
for the injury under Chapter 2, compensation under this chapter may not be payable.
The Commission therefore reaffirms its determination that the prior settlement by Mrs. Giles,
Oakridge, Workers' Compensation Fund, and ERF of Mrs. Giles' injury claim, and the payment of
workers' compensation benefits to Mrs. Giles pursuant to that claim, precludes an additional award
of occupational disease benefits to Mrs. Giles for the same medical condition.
Ms. Giles's second category of arguments focus on the propriety of summary dismissal of
her occupational disease claim. As noted above, Mrs. Giles is precluded as a matter of law from
receiving occupational disease benefits for the same medical condition that is the basis for payment
of her workers' compensation benefits. Furthermore, Mrs. Giles has failed to identify evidence that
would support liability on the part of defendants Wasatch Crest, ACE-US A/Pacific, Constitution
State, Transportation Insurance Company, the I.R.S., TAD or Liberty Mutual. The Commission
remains convinced that no genuine dispute exists regarding the facts that are material to the
resolution of this matter, and that the defendants are entitled to dismissal of Mrs. Giles' occupational
disease claim as a matter of law.
Finally, Mrs. Giles raises a host of issues regarding notice, discovery, failure to appoint a
medical panel, lack of good faith, and conflict of interest. Mrs. Giles' arguments on these issues
reflect some confusion over the facts, as well as a misunderstandings of Commission practice and
applicable procedural standards. Furthermore, Mrs. Giles' request for reconsideration submits
evidence that was not presented to Judge LaJeunesse or, even later, as part of Mrs. Giles' initial
motion for review to the Commission. Likewise, Mrs. Giles' request for reconsideration raises
allegations and procedural challenges that were not raised in her initial motion for review.
Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that a motion
for review ". . . shall: . . . (ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; . . . ."
Furthermore, §34-46b-12(l)(a) establishes a 30-day jurisdictional time limit for filing motions for
review. The foregoing provisions as essential to the fair and orderly conclusion of administrative
adjudicative proceedings. The Commission has consistently declined to consider evidence or issues
raised for the first time as part of a request for reconsideration, unless such matters could not
reasonably have been raised earlier.
In this case, the Commission finds no basis to conclude that Mrs. Giles' newly-presented
evidence or arguments could not have been submitted to Judge LaJeunesse and also incorporated into
Mrs. Giles' motion for review. The Commission therefore declines to accept or consider such
evidence or argument now.
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ORDER
The Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this matter and denies Mrs. Giles' request for
reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this ((/day of July, 2003.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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